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Ideomotor theory claims that perceptual representations of action-effects are functionally
involved in the planning of actions. Strong evidence for this claim comes from a phe-
nomenon called motorvisual priming. Motorvisual priming refers to the finding that action
planning directly affects perception, and that the effects are selective for stimuli that
share features with the planned action. Motorvisual priming studies have provided detailed
insights into the processing of perceptual representations in action planning. One important
finding is that such representations in action planning have a categorical format, whereas
metric representations are not anticipated in planning. Further essential findings regard
the processing mechanisms and the time course of ideomotor cognition. Perceptual rep-
resentations of action-effects are first activated by action planning and then bound into a
compound representation of the action plan. This compound representation is stabilized
throughout the course of the action by the shielding of all involved representations from
other cognitive processes. Despite a rapid growth in the number of motorvisual priming
studies in the current literature, there are still many aspects of ideomotor cognition which
have not yet been investigated. These aspects include the scope of ideomotor processing
with regard to action types and stimulus types, as well as the exact nature of the binding
and shielding mechanisms involved.
Keywords: motorvisual priming, dual task, ideomotor theory, binding, planning and control model, action-effect
blindness, categorical perception
INTRODUCTION
Human behavior is to a large degree anticipative and goal-directed.
That means most of our actions are not merely direct responses
to environmental stimuli, but are selected with regard to an antic-
ipated action goal. How anticipated action goals are cognitively
processed in action selection is an extensively researched area in
cognitive psychology (e.g., Nikolaev et al., 2008; Nattkemper et al.,
2010; Pfister et al., 2012). Currently one of the most influential
theories in this area is the ideomotor theory (Massen and Prinz,
2009; Shin et al., 2010). The fundamental claim of ideomotor the-
ory is that anticipated action goals processed in action selection
are represented as the sensory consequences of achieving those
goals. To put it another way, action selection involves perceptual
representations of action-effects (Kunde et al., 2007; Waszak et al.,
2012). Various versions of ideomotor theory have emerged in the
cognitive psychology literature during the last three decades (see
Kunde et al., 2007; Nattkemper et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2010, for
reviews). Despite some conceptual differences between these ver-
sions, all variations are based on two essential hypotheses: first,
goal-directed behavior is achieved by goal representations which
have a functional role in action selection. Second, the goal rep-
resentations are represented in the same format as sensory input
from these goal states would be represented (Prinz, 1997).
Although the ideomotor theory has a long history in philosophy
and psychology (Stock and Stock, 2004; Pfister and Janczyk, 2012),
it has evolved with increasing rapidity only since the late 1990s,
owing to a growing number of empirical findings supporting the
involvement of perception in action processing (see Nattkemper
et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2010, for reviews). During this time a set of
classical ideomotor paradigms has emerged.
One example is the response-effect-compatibility paradigm
(Kunde, 2001, 2003, 2004; Koch and Kunde, 2002; Rieger, 2007;
Janczyk et al., 2009; Pfister et al., 2010). In response-effect-
compatibility experiments, participants provide free or forced
choice responses, which have task-irrelevant effects. Effects can be
compatible (i.e., naturally following on from the current response,
e.g., a left stimulus following a left key press), or incompatible.
Responses are on average faster when they are followed by compat-
ible effects than by incompatible ones. A performance decrement
when action and effect are constantly mismatched indicates that
response processing is sensitive to action-effect matching, and
involves, thus, some representations of effects (Hoffmann et al.,
2001).
Another classical paradigm in ideomotor research is the effect-
learning paradigm (Elsner and Hommel, 2001, 2004; Hommel
et al., 2003; Kray et al., 2006; Hoffmann et al., 2009). The logic is
similar to the response-effect-compatibility design, the only dif-
ference being that the action-effect associations are acquired only
during the experiment, in an initial learning phase. In a semi-
nal study by Elsner and Hommel (2001) participants pressed two
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keys in an arbitrary self-chosen sequence. The keys were contin-
gently followed by tone effects. After that, either a forced or a free
choice test phase was employed (differing between experiments
and studies). In a forced choice test phase, the former action-
effects now figured as action cues. Participants were faster when
the cue response mapping matched the cue effect mapping experi-
enced in the learning phase than when the mapping was reversed
(see also Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009). In a free
choice test phase, where the former action-effects figured as Go-
signals, participants chose more often than chance would suggest
the response which had been followed, in the learning phase, by
the current Go-signal (see also Hoffmann et al., 2009; Pfister et al.,
2011).
Further prominent paradigms in the context of the ideomotor
theory include versions of the Serial Response Time paradigm
(Nissen and Bullemer, 1987) that emphasize the formation of
R-S associations (Ziessler, 1998; Ziessler and Nattkemper, 2001),
and studies where human movement stimuli induce compatible
response tendencies in observers (Knuf et al., 2001; De Maeght
and Prinz, 2004; Prinz et al., 2005; Häberle et al., 2008; Watanabe,
2008).
Although research with these paradigms has produced signifi-
cant knowledge about ideomotor mechanisms, they provide only
relatively indirect access to the processing of perceptual representa-
tions in action. In these paradigms, the process of action selection
can only be primed in advance by perceptual activation. The
effectiveness of perceptual effect-like primes on the consecutive
action is interpreted as evidence for the involvement of perceptual
representations in the selection of these actions. A more direct
experimental access to ideomotor cognition would require mea-
suring perceptual processing online, during action planning. This
strategy is realized in motorvisual priming paradigms.
MOTORVISUAL PRIMING
In motorvisual priming paradigms, a response action (R1) is
selected and executed in response to a perceptual cue (S1), while,
concurrently, a stimulus (S2) has to be detected or identified
(see Figure 1). The experimenter manipulates whether S2 is
ideomotor-compatible with R1 (i.e., whether on any dimension
it is similar to an effect of R1) or not. This compatibility usually
affects the speed or accuracy of S2 perception. Such compatibility
effects are commonly seen as originating from an involvement of
perceptual representations of effect-compatible stimuli in action
planning (Kunde and Wühr, 2004).
Motorvisual priming paradigms can, on the one hand, be real-
ized as single task versions (Craighero et al., 2002). In this case,
S2 mostly figures as a Go-Signal for R1 (see Figure 1). The iden-
tity of R1 is cued by S1, but R1 is withheld until presentation
of S2. Although the identity of the Go-Signal is irrelevant to the
task, its ideomotor-compatibility with the withheld response still
has an effect on the response correctness and latency (Craighero
et al., 1999). These effects are commonly interpreted as reflecting
the processing of perceptual representations in action planning
(Craighero et al., 2002; Bortoletto et al., 2011).
On the other hand, motorvisual priming paradigms have also
been realized in dual task versions. In these studies R1 is planned
according to S1 and executed either immediately (Müsseler and
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of motorvisual single tasks and
motorvisual dual tasks. In both types of tasks R1 is selected according to
a perceptual cue S1. During R1 preparation, a target stimulus S2 is
presented. The experimenter manipulates whether R1 and S2 are
ideomotor-compatible or not, that is, whether S2 resembles, in any respect,
an effect of R1. In single tasks S2 figures as Go-stimulus for R1. In dual
tasks S2 identity is reported by a secondary response R2. Thus, R1 and S2
are functionally unrelated. A motorvisual priming effect is present when
R1-S2 compatibility affects R1 performance in single tasks, or when R1-S2
compatibility affects R2 performance in dual tasks.
Wühr, 2002; Wühr and Müsseler, 2002), at the participant’s
own pace (Eder and Klauer, 2007; Oriet et al., 2007), or after a
compatibility-neutral Go-Signal (Kunde and Wühr, 2004; Hom-
mel and Müsseler, 2006). At different times during the preparation
or execution of R1,a second stimulus S2 is displayed. S2, in contrast
to single task versions, is not a Go-Signal for R1 here, but belongs
to a second unrelated task instead (see Figure 1). The second task
consists in reporting the identity of S2 by a secondary – either
speeded (Zwickel et al., 2007; Pfister et al., 2012) or unspeeded
(Müsseler and Hommel, 1997a; Stevanovski et al., 2002) – response
R2. Although R1 and S2 belong to different tasks and are function-
ally unrelated, influences of ideomotor-compatibility between R1
and S2 on R2 performance have frequently been observed. These
effects are commonly interpreted as being owed to the involvement
of perceptual representations in R1 processing. In R1-S2 compat-
ible trials, this involvement interferes with S2 perception, and this
interference is reflected by R2 performance (Müsseler, 1999; Eder
and Klauer, 2009).
Motorvisual priming is, of course, not the only way in which
actions can affect perception of ideomotor-compatible stimuli.
There is accumulative evidence that motor-expertise with certain
movement types (e.g., athletics or dancing) can selectively improve
the perception of movements of this type (Calvo-Merino et al.,
2005; Craig et al., 2009; Hohmann et al., 2011; Cañal-Bruland
et al., 2012; Diersch et al., 2012). A similar long-term motorvisual
effect has been observed in experimentally controlled motorvi-
sual learning studies. Motorvisual learning experiments typically
include a motor-learning phase, where the participants acquire
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new movement patterns, and a visual test phase, where the partici-
pants have to observe similar movement patterns. Results typically
show that movement practice selectively improves or biases per-
ceptual capacities for stimuli similar to the motor-practiced ones
(Hecht et al., 2001; Casile and Giese, 2006; Engel et al., 2008a,b;
Beets et al., 2010; Glenberg et al., 2010). Both learning phenomena
can be interpreted as evidence for the involvement of perceptual
representations in motor execution (Vogt and Thomaschke, 2007).
Although such motorvisual learning transfer studies are of emi-
nent importance in determining visuomotor processing in skill
acquisition, they are, however, of limited value for the detailed
investigation of ideomotor mechanisms. As in the aforementioned
effect-learning paradigms, inferences are drawn from relations
between different experimental phases. These conclusions are
informative about how one acquires action-effect associations,
but are less informative about the mechanisms by which the
acquired action-effects bring about intended actions. For that rea-
son, motorvisual priming studies pose a much more powerful and
temporally precise tool, because these paradigms allow manip-
ulation and measurement of ideomotor processes in an online,
trialwise fashion. Consequently, the present review focused on
motorvisual priming studies, although occasional evidence from
learning studies is cited when directly related to the findings from
priming studies.
MOTORVISUAL PRIMING AND IDEOMOTOR THEORY
Motorvisual priming studies have frequently been cited as sup-
port for the ideomotor theory (Stoet and Hommel, 1999; Kunde
and Wühr, 2004; Shin et al., 2010). Actually, only rarely has any
other explanation been offered for motorvisual priming than the
processing of perceptual representations in action (see, however,
Oades and Kreul, 2001, for an exception). Indeed it seems difficult
to explain why actions should affect unrelated perceptual events,
if perceptual representations are not involved in action process-
ing. Thus, motorvisual priming can be regarded as one of the most
convincing cases of empirical evidence for ideomotor theory’s cen-
tral claim that action planning processes perceptual action-effects.
The reference to motorvisual priming in the ideomotor literature
is quite general, however. It usually does not go beyond citing
motorvisual priming as support for the theory in general. This is
in stark contrast with the high informative value that motorvisual
priming studies have for the understanding of many aspects of
processing perceptual effect representations in action selection.
The aim of the present review is to show that previous motorvi-
sual priming studies allow precise conclusions about the detailed
functional role that perceptual representations play in action
planning. Furthermore I discuss potential methodological pitfalls
in designing motorvisual priming studies, and sketch directions
for future motorvisual priming research which might further
elucidate the mechanisms of ideomotor cognition.
HOW ARE PERCEPTUAL EFFECT REPRESENTATIONS
PROCESSED IN ACTION PLANNING?
In the following two subsections, I review evidence from motorvi-
sual priming studies on different aspects of ideomotor cognition.
First, it will be argued that results from motorvisual priming stud-
ies allow the nature of perceptual representations processed in
action planning to be determined, and that the findings are in
accordance with predictions of current theories of ideomotor cog-
nition. Second, motorvisual evidence for the binding of perceptual
action-effects in action plans is discussed. Motorvisual priming
studies have shown that action selection activates and binds effect
representations throughout planning and execution, in order to
stabilize the action plan against interferences.
IDEOMOTOR COGNITION PROCESSES CATEGORICAL
REPRESENTATIONS OF ACTION-EFFECTS
As reviewed above there is plenty of evidence for the involvement
of perceptual representations in action processing. One impor-
tant question which has not been answered in the action-effect
learning studies previously discussed is the format which these
perceptual representations have. Are they perceptual representa-
tions of a categorical symbolic nature or are they metric spatial
representations? In this subsection I will show that motorvisual
priming studies can answer this question, and that it is in favor of
categorical representations.
There is accumulative interdisciplinary evidence that human
cognitive processing makes use of two fundamentally different
kinds of mental representations (Kosslyn, 1987, 2006; Logan, 1995;
Kosslyn et al., 1998; Okubo et al., 2010). One class of mental rep-
resentations is commonly referred to as categorical. Categorical
representations are of a relational nature. They are used to repre-
sent cognitive entities – like stimuli or responses – as members
of categories. Typical examples include word identities, affec-
tive categories (positive/negative), or abstract propositional spatial
categories (e.g., above/below, or left/right).
Categorical representations are usually defined in opposition
to metric representations. Metric representations are coordinate
representations of exact spatial relations. Examples include the
coordinate location of a stimulus or an effector, or the exact size
or rotational angle of an object (Kosslyn, 1994).
Categorical representations in planning and control
In order to answer the question of which representations are sub-
ject to ideomotor cognition, one must take into account that action
processing is commonly conceived of as consisting of two different
sub-processes, planning and control, and that these sub-processes
differ with respect to the processed representations.
Most theories of motor cognition distinguish between move-
ment planning processes and movement control processes (Elliott
et al., 2001; Glover et al., 2012). Planning processes integrate moti-
vational, environmental, and goal-anticipative factors in order to
determine the appropriate action in a given situation. Action plan-
ning does not specify in advance the entire course of the movement
until its completion,but instead determines only the gross parame-
ters in order to initiate the movement (e.g., which effector, which
initial direction, etc., see Schmidt, 1975; Hommel, 2005, 2010).
Movement control, on the other hand, comes into play once
the movement is chosen and initiated. Movement control speci-
fies the exact movement parameters online via fast feedback cycles.
Control constantly compares predictions based on the actual state
of the movement with incoming sensory information, in order
to minimize mismatch between movement goal and prospec-
tive course of the movement (Wolpert et al., 1998; Wolpert and
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Ghahramani, 2000; Bubic et al., 2010). Movement control works
at high speed and can rapidly correct for movement disturbances
and perturbations in target size, location, or orientation (Prablanc
and Pélisson, 1990; Gosselin-Kessiby et al., 2008; Hesse and Franz,
2009; van de Kamp et al., 2009).
Glover (Glover, 2002, 2004; Glover and Dixon, 2002) has sug-
gested that movement planning primarily processes categorical
representations whereas control processes only metric informa-
tion. This proposal has been supported by a considerable amount
of evidence from empirical studies that compared the effects of
categorical and/or metric manipulations on planning and control
processes (see Glover, 2004; Thomaschke et al., 2012a, for reviews).
For example, Keulen et al. (2004) have shown that priming a reach-
ing task with the gross layout of the target distracter distribution,
pertinent to categorical coding, affected only the early planning
stage of grasping. The locational coordinate distance between dis-
tracter and target, likely to infer with metric processing, on the
other hand, affected only later control stages of the grasping move-
ments. In a dual task study, Liu et al. (2008) showed that a letter
identification task affected a secondary pointing movement task
only in RT (a measure of planning duration), but not in accu-
racy (a measure of control effectiveness). Likewise, Spiegel et al.
(2012) found that planning a grasping movement impairs a sec-
ondary verbal working memory task, but grasping control does
not. Hesse and Deubel (2011) showed that a digit identification
task affected initial movement parameters in the early phase of
a grasping movement, whereas the later, control-based, phase of
the movement was unaffected. See Glover and Dixon (2002) and
Thomaschke et al. (2012b) for further evidence that planning
processes categorical information and control processes metric
information.
These findings lead to a clear conclusion concerning the type
of perceptual representations in ideomotor cognition. As the ideo-
motor principle – that action selection involves perceptual effect
processing – concerns action selection, not action control, ideo-
motor theory is commonly assumed to relate exclusively to the
action planning stage, not to action control (Kunde et al., 2007;
Shin et al., 2010; Janczyk et al., 2012). Consequently, the ideo-
motor theory would suggest that the perceptual representations
processed in motor cognition are of a categorical nature.
Types of mental representation in motorvisual priming
Motorvisual priming studies provide a simple straightforward
test for the ideomotor theory’s prediction that perceptual rep-
resentations in action planning are categorical. When motorvisual
priming effects are owed to perceptual processing in action selec-
tion, then one would assume that such effects can only be observed
for dual tasks where the overlap between R1 and S2 is categorical
rather than metric.
At first glance, the empirical findings are clearly at odds with
this prediction. Motorvisual priming has been observed for cate-
gorical R1-S2 overlap (e.g., Kunde and Wühr, 2004), but also for
instances where the overlap can unambiguously be described as
metric (e.g., sharing a certain spatial location, see Deubel et al.,
1998), and for stimuli where it is ambiguous whether the overlap
is categorical or metric (e.g., biological stimuli, Jacobs and Shiffrar,
2005; Miall et al., 2006).
Closer inspection reveals, however, that the effect direction in
motorvisual priming research systematically varies between differ-
ent studies, depending on the type of the representations involved.
Some have reported motorvisual impairment, whereas perception
was facilitated by compatible action in other studies (Schütz-
Bosbach and Prinz, 2007; see Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson,
2007; Press et al., 2009; Thomaschke et al., 2012a; and Zwickel and
Prinz, 2012, for systematic discussions of this issue). The effect
direction allows a clear distinction to be drawn between motorvi-
sual effects owed to action planning and motorvisual effects owed
to other action-related processes.
One important aspect of action planning processes is that
they integrate and stabilize the features of a selected movement.
This ensures that the basic features of the movement (e.g., which
effector is moved) remain constant throughout its course. This,
however, requires that movement features are shielded against
access by other cognitive processes, including other action alter-
natives, including perceptual processes (Müsseler, 1999; Stoet and
Hommel, 1999). As perceptual effect representations, according to
ideomotor theory, are also features of an action plan, these features
are also shielded against other cognitive processes, including per-
ception. Thus, ideomotor theory would predict that action plan-
ning impairs the perception of effect-compatible stimuli, instead
of facilitating it (Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2009).
Types of mental representation in motorvisual interference.
When we consider only motorvisual impairment studies among
the motorvisual priming studies – that is, studies where the
motorvisual priming effect can unambiguously be ascribed to
perceptual processing in action planning – the overlap between
R1 and S2 is exclusively on a categorical dimension. Motorvisual
impairment has been shown for speaking and identifying direc-
tion words (Hommel and Müsseler, 2006), or color words (Kunde
and Wühr, 2004), and for writing and identifying letters of cer-
tain forms (James and Gauthier, 2009). Other examples include
impairment from left/right key presses on left/right pointing arrow
symbols (Müsseler and Hommel, 1997b), and impairment from
positively/negatively charged lever movements on the detection
of positive/negative words (Eder and Klauer, 2007, 2009). Hence,
motorvisual priming studies have confirmed the ideomotor the-
ory’s prediction that ideomotor cognition relates exclusively to
categorical representations (see also Zwickel et al., 2010a, for a
discussion of this issue).
Some authors have divided categorical representations further
into verbal categorical representations and spatial categorical rep-
resentations (Kemmerer and Tranel, 2000; Tranel and Kemmerer,
2004; van der Ham and Postma, 2010; van der Ham and Borst,
2011). A motorvisual priming study by Hommel and Müsseler
(2006), has shown that both kinds of categorical representations
can figure as perceptual effect representations in action selec-
tion. In one experiment speaking the words left/right impaired
the identification of the written words left/right in compatible
trials compared with incompatible trials (Exp. 3B). The overlap
in this experiment can clearly be regarded as categorical verbal.
In an analogous experiment (Exp. 1A), with left/right key presses
as R1, and left/right pointing arrow symbols as S2, the overlap
was categorical spatial. Again, a motorvisual impairment effect
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 519 | 4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomaschke Ideomotor cognition and motorvisual priming
was observed. In further experiments with the cross-conditions,
spoken words with arrow heads (Exp. 2B), and key presses with
written words (Exp. 3A), no motorvisual impairment effect was
observed. The absence of an effect in the latter experiments con-
firmed that two different kinds of categorical representations
were applied. Thus, action selection involves spatial and verbal
categorical representations.
Further support for the strict confinement of ideomotor cog-
nition to categorical representations comes from the finding that
motorvisual priming effects – that are not related to action selec-
tion (see above) – have been observed only for metric spatial R1-S2
overlap on non-categorical dimensions. These studies can be clas-
sified in motorvisual priming studies with non-biological metric
R1-S2 overlap, and with biological motion stimuli. I discuss each
type in turn.
Motorvisual facilitation with metric representations. When R1
and S2 overlap on a metric dimension, effects are either absent
(Bonfiglioli et al., 2002) or in a positive direction (Hommel and
Schneider, 2002; e.g., Paprotta et al., 1999; Wykowska et al., 2009,
2011, 2012) in the sense of better performance when R1 and S2 are
metrically compatible than when they are not. Motorvisual facili-
tation effects are thought to reflect action control, instead of action
selection (Hommel, 2009, 2010; Thomaschke et al., 2012a). Action
control is a closed loop process leading to rapid constant online
updating of precise metric information in order to correct poten-
tial target movement mismatches (Wolpert et al., 1998; Wolpert
and Ghahramani, 2000). This process benefits greatly from atten-
tional pre-selection of movement-relevant areas in perceptual
space. Thus actions, once selected, strongly facilitate processing of
compatible metric representations like effector laterality (Hommel
and Schneider, 2002; Koch et al., 2003; Müsseler et al., 2005; Press
et al., 2009; Gherri and Eimer, 2010), goal location (Fischer, 1997;
Linnell et al., 2005), orientation (Lindemann and Bekkering, 2009;
Janczyk et al., 2012), or size (Fagioli et al., 2007a,b; Symes et al.,
2008, 2010). This motorvisual facilitation effect is, in contrast to
action planning, independent from action context (Fischer et al.,
2007; Thomaschke et al., 2012b) but it is selective with regard to
the specific control demands of different movement types (Fischer
and Hoellen, 2004). For example, pointing movements particu-
larly facilitate locational metric processing (Deubel and Schneider,
2004; Collins et al., 2008), whereas grasping facilitates metric size
processing (Symes et al., 2008) and orientation processing (Lin-
demann and Bekkering, 2009; see Memelink and Hommel, 2012,
for a review of motorvisual facilitation with different movement
types).
Two recent works have directly compared motorvisual facil-
itation and impairment in one and the same study, and have
confirmed that impairment is obtained with categorical R1-S2
overlap and facilitation can be observed with metric R1-S2 over-
lap. Koch (2009) found a motorvisual dual task facilitation effect
in response times with a metric visual task (orientation judgment)
and motorvisual interference with an analogous categorical visual
task (object naming). Thomaschke et al. (2012b) found that left
key presses impaired perception of symbols pointing to the left
(categorical overlap), but facilitated stimulus perception in the left
visual field (metric overlap).
Thus, evidence from motorvisual priming studies with metric
R1-S2 overlap fully confirms the prediction of ideomotor theory.
As metric representations are not involved in ideomotor cognition,
these paradigms have not yielded motorvisual impairment effects
(as would have been characteristic of perceptual effects from action
selection), but have exclusively produced motorvisual facilitation
effects.
At this point, two clarifications are needed to clearly distinguish
between the processes related to action selection and those related
to action control. One concerns feedback loop processing in motor
cognition, and the other concerns categorical activation by relative
location.
Closed loops in action planning. Note that some versions of the
ideomotor theory also assume a kind of a feedback loop (see
Nattkemper et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2012; Waszak et al., 2012,
for reviews). In particular, it is assumed that the action selec-
tion process is shaped by information about whether actions have
successfully achieved their intended action-effect or not. There-
fore perceptual representations of action-effects can be associated
more precisely with appropriate generative actions, which, in turn,
makes action selection more effective (Ziessler et al., 2004). These
feedback loops do, however, relate rather to the acquisition of
action-effect associations, instead of the actual online process-
ing of perceptual representation in action-perception. Conse-
quently, they are not likely to affect perception during action
selection.
Categorical activation by relative location. Responses and stimuli
always have metric representations of location, simply because
stimuli and responses necessarily occupy a location in physical
space. When metrical information is important for response con-
trol, processing of metrically compatible stimuli is facilitated (e.g.,
in the left visual field, for left pointing movements, see above).
Depending on task context, however, the location of a stimulus
can also activate a categorical, relational representation of its posi-
tion, which is employed in action planning. When, for example,
a stimulus frequently appears in different locations which are rel-
ative left/right to each other, it automatically activates categorical
left/right representations, even when the stimulus location is task-
irrelevant. Such effects have been observed in Simon effect (Proc-
tor and Vu, 2006) studies, and in response-effect-compatibility
studies (see introduction) with response compatible locations.
Kunde (2001), for example has shown that horizontally arranged
finger press responses to non-spatial imperative stimuli are facili-
tated more when the responses are followed by locationally com-
patible visual stimuli than when they are followed by incompatible
stimuli (see above). In this study, response planning has activated
categorical representations of response location, and categorical
representations of effect location, which have been compatible in
one condition and incompatible in the other. Consequently, in the
former condition, response planning was facilitated. Note that the
results from motorvisual facilitation studies reviewed here strongly
suggest that (owing to the metric overlap and control relevance)
effect perception was facilitated in the compatible condition rela-
tive to the incompatible one. This was, however, not measured in
Kunde’s study.
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Motorvisual facilitation for human movement stimuli. There
is accumulative behavioral and neuroscientific evidence that the
rapid metric visuomotor feedback loops employed in action con-
trol also have a function in the perception and prediction of others’
movements. Behavioral (Catmur and Heyes, 2011; Heyes, 2011;
Martel et al., 2011; Boyer et al., 2012) and neuroscientific (Saygin
et al., 2004) studies have shown that the observation of others’
movements covertly activates the own motor system in a compat-
ible way (see also the examples of ideomotor induction in section
Introduction). The covert motor activation is likely to launch the
same movement control processes as an active movement would
have done (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Fagioli et al., 2007a).
These control processes constantly produce predictions for the
next immediately expected perceptual input caused by the move-
ment, based on the current state of the motor system (Wolpert
et al., 1995). For actually executed movements, such predictions
have the function of detecting and correcting for mismatches
between action goal and predicted course of the action (see above).
Wilson and Knoblich (2005) have recently argued that these pre-
dictions are also employed in the observation of others’ actions.
They could serve to stabilize the ongoing percept by assisting per-
ceptual disambiguation (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). This visual
function of motor control is reflected in motorvisual facilitation
effects in dual tasks which apply biological motion displays (Miall
et al., 2006). In particular, metric positional prediction of future
visual movement states is facilitated when compatible movements
are planned or executed (Graf et al., 2007; Springer et al., 2011,
2012; Saygin and Stadler, 2012; Stadler et al., 2012).
As this perceptual function of action is not dependent on action
planning, however, and is thus not in the domain of ideomotor
cognition, ideomotor theory would predict no motorvisual inter-
ference effects with biological stimuli. The data from motorvisual
priming studies are in line with this prediction. The effects are
mostly facilitative. Only when the temporal asynchrony between
executed and observed movement is too extreme for predictions to
be perceptually supportive have interferences been observed (see
Christensen et al., 2011, for a review).
Conclusion
Evidence from motorvisual priming studies shows that ideomotor
cognition is confined to categorical representations. Motorvisual
priming has been shown for almost all kinds of representations.
Effect direction, however, allows the motorvisual effect caused by
ideomotor processes to be identified, because these processes typ-
ically lead to motorvisual impairment. Motorvisual impairment
has only been observed with categorical stimuli. Motorvisual facil-
itation effects, on the other hand, have only been shown with
metric representations and with biological stimuli. These effects
are owed to motor control processes, and are, consequently, not in
the domain of ideomotor theory.
ACTION PLANS BIND ACTIVE PERCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS
DURING ACTION EXECUTION
Motorvisual priming paradigms are informative, not only about
the nature of perceptual representation in action planning, but
also about the way in which these representations are processed.
The duration of motorvisual priming effects suggests that per-
ceptual representations are bound in action plans to shield them
from competing processes. Furthermore, the boundary conditions
for motorvisual priming to occur suggest that action planning first
activates perceptual representations before binding them. I discuss
each issue in turn.
The duration of motorvisual interference
In early studies on motorvisual impairment priming, the effect
was explained in terms of refractoriness of perceptual represen-
tation by action planning (Müsseler and Hommel, 1997a). These
explanations assumed that perceptual representations are briefly
activated during action selection, just at the point when they are
employed to inform motor parameter choice in an ideomotor
fashion. According to these explanations, the impaired availabil-
ity of the action-effect representation for concurrent perceptual
processes results from refractory inhibition of the representation
following its brief ideomotor activation. Hence, the reduced avail-
ability of action-effect representations for other processes would
have been only a byproduct of ideomotor cognition, without own
functional value. This account of motorvisual impairment sug-
gests a rather narrow time window for the effect, near the time of
action execution (see Wühr and Müsseler, 2001, for a discussion).
Contrary to this prediction, however, in further investigations
of motorvisual impairment, the effect has been observed during a
relatively long time window, spanning from at least 2000 ms before
action execution (Wühr and Müsseler, 2001, Exp. 2) until 1000 ms
after action execution (Müsseler and Wühr, 2002; Stevanovski
et al., 2002, Exp. 1; Oriet et al., 2003a,b; Wühr and Müsseler, 2002).
These findings have led to the interpretation of the motorvisual
impairment effect as an indicator of something more essential in
ideomotor cognition than a byproduct caused by refractoriness.
Stoet and Hommel (1999) have suggested that action selection
entails binding processes which connect all selection-relevant fea-
tures of an action into a common event file (Hommel, 2004).
Perceptual representations of action-effects are also features of an
action and are, according to ideomotor theory, selection-relevant.
Thus, these representations are also bound into event files. These
binding mechanisms stabilize action plans through the course of
their execution, and therefore shield the action plan against inter-
ferences from other cognitive processes, like, for example, other
competing action plans. They can also prevent the same action
being cyclically triggered again and again by the activated effect
anticipations (Müsseler, 1999). Since the mid-2000s, a consider-
able amount of evidence has been accumulated in favor of event file
binding in action planning (see, e.g., Colzato et al., 2006; Hommel,
2007; Mattson and Fournier, 2008; Wiediger and Fournier, 2008).
Binding of features into action plans has also been referred to as
“occupation” (Schubö et al., 2004) or “encapsulation” (Müsseler,
1999). Based on the prolonged time course of motorvisual interfer-
ence, Wühr and Müsseler (2001) have concluded that motorvisual
impairment is caused by the binding of perceptual event repre-
sentations in compound representations of the action plan. This
view has now become common sense in motorvisual interfer-
ence research (Hommel, 2004; Nishimura and Yokosawa, 2010a;
Thomaschke et al., 2012b).
The boundaries of binding
Stoet and Hommel (1999) suggest that action selection consists
of two phases. First, the relevant action features are activated, and
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after activation they are quickly bound into a composite repre-
sentation of the action. The binding of activated action features
remains intact throughout the course of the movement. Motorvi-
sual priming studies have supported this view with regard to
perceptual representations of action-effects. Particularly informa-
tive are studies on situations where the second phase of Stoet
and Hommel’s model – the binding phase – had either not yet
commenced, was already over, or was prevented by certain task
demands. I will discuss each of these issues in turn.
Motorvisual priming before binding. According to Stoet and
Hommel, action features are first activated and then bound. In
order to investigate the transition between both phases directly one
would have to measure motorvisual priming effects at the point
when features are activated but not yet bound. In the majority of
motorvisual interference studies, this condition is, however, not
met. Usually R1 is executed at leisure after S1, and S2 perception is
measured shortly before, shortly after, or during execution of R1
(e.g., Müsseler et al., 2000, 2001; Eder and Klauer, 2007; Nishimura
and Yokosawa, 2010a). Under such a scenario, R1 features can be
assumed to be long activated and bound when participants initiate
the movement and S2 is presented.
A study by Müsseler and Wühr (2002) has, however, applied
speeded R1 responses and has measured S2 perception almost
immediately after S1. At this point it can be assumed that the S2
compatible perceptual representations are already activated by R1
selection but not yet bound. Müsseler and Wühr (2002, Exp. 2)
applied a relatively difficult speeded four-choice task with inter-
vals of 200, 400, or 1000 ms between S1 and S2. They observed the
typical impairment effect at 400 and 1000 ms, but a motorvisual
facilitation effect was observed at 200 ms. Participants needed on
average around 600 ms for their speeded responses to the cues.
This indicates that S1-R1 translation was particularly difficult in
this task and binding followed activation after more than 200 ms.
Motorvisual priming after binding. Other studies have inves-
tigated motorvisual priming after the binding phase. When S2
is presented at increasing time intervals after R1 execution, the
motorvisual interference effect gets significantly weaker (Oriet
et al., 2003b, Exp. 1, 2007; Wühr and Müsseler, 2001, Exp. 1).
In some studies the priming effect turned into facilitation at the
longest interval. For example, Müsseler et al., 2001, Exp. 2) had
three timing conditions. R1 was to be executed immediately after
a self-paced neutral double key press. S2 was presented at the dou-
ble key press, at R1, or 500 ms after R1. The typical motorvisual
impairment effect was found at the former conditions. When S2
was presented 500 ms after R1, however, a motorvisual facilitation
effect was observed (see Schubö et al., 2004, for a similar pattern).
These results can be seen as further support for the two-
phase view of action planning. After action execution, binding
is not required any longer and consequently released, but activa-
tion in the action features, including perceptual representations of
action-effects, still persists, and consequently causes motorvisual
facilitation, when S2 is presented late after R1 (see also James and
Gauthier, 2009, for a related discussion).
Motorvisual priming without binding. Another important
source of information concerning the activation/binding view of
action planning is motorvisual priming studies with movement
tasks that counteract the binding process. A study by Caessens and
Vandierendonck (2002) has been particularly illuminating in this
respect. They applied a Stop-Signal paradigm, where participants
had to execute speeded lateral key presses as R1 in response to
visual S1. In half of the trials, a stop-signal appeared 200 ms after
S1. In the latter case participants had to refrain from executing
R1. After a variable SOA, a masked arrowhead was presented as
S2. In one experiment (Exp. 1A), the typical motorvisual impair-
ment from R1 planning on the perception of compatible S2 was
observed. In a further experiment (Exp. 1B), however, Caessens
and Vandierendonck increased the difficulty of the Stop-Signal
procedure. Again, in half of the trials, a stop-signal was presented
but the interval between S1 and the stop-signal was individually
adapted by a staircase procedure such that participants were only
able to refrain from responding in half of the Stop-Signal trials.
Thus, binding of the response features into a composite represen-
tation in order to shield them from other processes would have
been counterproductive here. In half of the trials this action plan
would have had to be abandoned in favor of a new plan to inhibit
the prepared action. Release of action features would have taken
time, hindering quick inhibition. Under these experimental con-
ditions, a motorvisual facilitation effect was observed, reflecting
feature activation, but not binding.
This finding suggests that binding only takes place when sta-
bilization of a chosen action is of advantage. In situations with
high action uncertainty, where action plans need to be quickly
abandoned and rapidly replanned very often, action features are
activated by ideomotor processes, but not bound.
Conclusion
Motorvisual priming studies have provided conclusive evidence
about the processing of perceptual representations in action plan-
ning. When perceptual representations are employed to select
actions in an ideomotor fashion, these representations are first
activated, to the effect that compatible perceptual processes are
facilitated. Then these representations are quickly bound, together
with other action features, into a composite action representation,
shielding them from involvement in other cognitive processes. The
binding process is only abandoned in situations where one has to
switch quickly between opposing action options.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the importance of motorvisual priming paradigms for
investigating ideomotor processes, there is an inherent method-
ological difficulty in measuring such effects which requires careful
consideration and control. Most behavioral cognitive psychology
paradigms are visuomotor paradigms in a very general sense. The
experimenter systematically manipulates the participant’s percep-
tual stimulation as an independent variable and records the partic-
ipant’s responses. This basic logic of psychological experiments is
designed to test hypotheses about causal effects from stimulus pre-
sentation on response production. Working in this intuitive way,
stimulus manipulation and response measurement are thought to
reveal regularities in mental processing from perception to action.
Stimuli are perfectly controllable and directly affect perceptual
processing, whereas responses are typically caused by internal
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mental processes. This experimental design appears intuitively
feasible since it meets our everyday experiences with perceptions
and actions. Perceptual stimulation is experienced as being largely
caused by the environment. We usually have to change the envi-
ronment (e.g., shifting objects into our visual field) to influence
perceptual stimulation (yet, it has sometimes been argued that a
scientific description of perception should not follow this intu-
ition, e.g., Gibson, 1979; Noë, 2004; Bompas and O’Regan, 2006).
Actions, on the contrary, are experienced as being produced or
at least largely shaped by our own cognitive system. Motorvi-
sual priming experiments have to reverse this highly intuitive
causal direction (just as ideomotor theory does on a concep-
tual level). Such experiments aim at establishing a causal effect
of response execution on stimulus perception. In order to do
this, an experimenter would have to directly control the action
intentions of the participants as an independent variable and
directly measure the content or other features of their visual
perception as a dependent variable. Both are practically impos-
sible. Although one can induce involuntary movements by neural
stimulation or by applying external forces to effectors, voluntary
action planning (often of central interest in motorvisual research
and constituting the central explanatory goal of ideomotor the-
ory) cannot be directly physically controlled by the experimenter
in a way comparable with stimulus manipulation in visuomo-
tor experiments. Likewise visual perception is an event inside
the participant’s brain, which cannot directly be observed, and
neuroscientific measurements are not precise enough to differ-
entiate between perceptual states to a degree that could reason-
ably be assumed to be affected by action. Hence, motorvisual
researchers have to apply indirect methods of response manip-
ulation and indirect measures of visual perception. Both can lead
to characteristic methodological problems, as will be discussed
in turn.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss potential alternative
non-motorvisual explanations for motorvisual priming studies
arising from those methodological problems. I also show how
these potential confounds have been dealt with in previous studies.
TRANSITIVITY OF STIMULUS SIMILARITY
The indirect manipulation of participants’ action planning
processes, as independent variable, is usually achieved by vary-
ing experimental instructions. In some paradigms, the instruction
to prepare a certain type of action is blocked. In order to avoid
learning effects, however, most motorvisual priming paradigms
vary the response randomly from trial to trial. This is commonly
done by displaying a response cue before each trial. The cue sig-
nals the response required in the current trial. In some trials the
cued response is compatible with the observed visual stimulus, in
others it is incompatible. A motorvisual interaction is detected by
comparing visual performance for compatible and incompatible
response-stimulus pairings. The compatibility relation between
stimulus and response is usually a very natural one and is a
salient feature of each (e.g., matching gestures, words, movement
directions, or common spatial locations). The instructed mapping
between cue and response, however, is also often a natural and
intuitive one. This ensures that the cue response translation does
not absorb too much cognitive capacity by requiring participants
to memorize and apply complex rules, which could lead to a deficit
in response correctness.
These requirements, to keep both the instructed cue response
mapping and the evaluated response-stimulus compatibility rela-
tion simple and intuitive, makes it tempting to choose similar or
even identical compatibility mappings for both. Doing so, how-
ever, leads to serious problems concerning the interpretation of
a potential compatibility interaction, because in such situations
compatibility between response and stimulus is always accompa-
nied by compatibility between response cue and stimulus. When
compatibility between cue and response and between response
and stimulus are defined in the same terms, then any systematic
compatibility effect of response-preparation on stimulus percep-
tion is indistinguishable from a compatibility effect of the cue on
stimulus perception (see also Hommel and Müsseler, 2006, for a
discussion of this issue).
Consequently, studies that apply analogous compatibility defi-
nitions for the cue response mappings and for response-stimulus
matching cannot be regarded as unambiguous evidence of a
motorvisual effect. Any compatibility effect could be owed to a
causal response-preparation stimulus perception link as well as to
a causal cue-perception stimulus perception link (the latter being
a visuovisual interaction). The motorvisual priming literature has
however suggested several strategies to control for this potential
interpretation problem.
For example, Müsseler and Hommel (1997a, Exp. 1, 2), Müs-
seler and Hommel (1997b, Exp. 1, 2) used the same stimuli (arrow
heads) for S1 cues and for S2 stimuli with identical cue response
and response-stimulus compatibility definitions. The effect was
also found, however, in motorvisual impairment experiments that
applied more complex cue response mapping. Müsseler and Hom-
mel cued the response with direction words instead of arrows
(Müsseler and Hommel, 1997a, Exp. 4) and reversed the natural
cue response mapping from the original experiment (Müsseler and
Hommel,1997a,Exp. 5),whereas Müsseler et al. used auditory cues
(Müsseler et al., 2000, Exp. 1) and required the participants to gen-
erate responses endogenously in an alternating sequence (Exp. 2).
These findings show that one of the most extensively researched
motorvisual priming paradigms (i.e., the priming of arrow per-
ception by lateral key presses) cannot be explained by visuovisual
effects.
TRANSITIVITY OF RESPONSE SIMILARITY
A comparable interpretation problem arises from the necessity
to measure stimulus perception indirectly in motorvisual exper-
iments. Perceptual performance is usually assessed by involving
a secondary response in the design. The secondary response R2
is either a speeded detection/identification of the stimulus (e.g.,
Craighero et al., 2002; Pfister et al., 2012) or an unspeeded report
of certain stimulus features (e.g., Müsseler and Hommel, 1997a)
or a reproduction of the stimulus movement (Schubö et al., 2004).
The speed or accuracy of R2 is a measure of the speed or accuracy of
the perceptual process. As regards S1-R1 mapping, however, there
are arguments for keeping the S2-R2 mapping relatively natural
and intuitive. This is especially important for speeded secondary
responses. A complex translation would be likely to require addi-
tional cognitive processing time and thereby add an additional
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source of variance to the response time, which would interfere
with the statistical detection of any response-stimulus compatibil-
ity effects. Yet, when R1-S2 compatibility and S2-R2 compatibility
are defined by the same mapping rules, the compatibilities cannot
vary independently of each other. In such a situation a compat-
ibility priming effect could not be assigned unambiguously to
motorvisual priming since it would be indistinguishable from a
primary-response secondary-response priming effect. Response–
response priming effects have frequently been observed in dual
tasks with compatibility relations between functionally unrelated
responses (Schuch and Koch, 2004; Wenke and Frensch, 2005).
This interpretability problem can also be controlled for, however.
For example, Müsseler and Hommel (1997a, Exp. 1), Müsseler and
Hommel (1997b, Exp. 1) used the same key pressing movements
as primary and secondary response with the same compatibility
definition but they also obtained a motorvisual interference effect
when, in a control experiment, the secondary responses were ver-
bal responses (direction words) instead of key presses (Müsseler
and Hommel, 1997a, Exp. 2).
An analogous criticism applies to Schubö et al. (2001, 2004)
motorvisual interference paradigm. The secondary response in
their paradigm figures as primary-response in the subsequent trial.
Thus, the compatibility mapping between response and stimulus
is identical with the mapping between stimulus and secondary
response. Schubö et al. (2004, Exp. 2) attempted to rule out a
response secondary response explanation by including an addi-
tional motor task (drawing circles) between trials. They found
comparable compatibility effects with and without such a task.
According to their interpretation, the motor task would have inter-
fered with, and thus eliminated, a response secondary response
compatibility effect.
VISUOMOTOR EXPLANATIONS IN MOTORVISUAL PRIMING
EXPERIMENTS
As reviewed in the introduction, visual processing can directly
affect motor processing, evidenced by influences of task-irrelevant
aspects of visual stimulation on motor action. When stimuli and
responses are compatible, responses are faster and more accu-
rate than with incompatible ones. Some of these visuomotor
effects have been interpreted as evidence for the ideomotor theory.
When the compatibility relation between stimulus and response
is an action-effect relation – i.e., when response performance is
better when responses are triggered by their typical perceptual
effects than when they are triggered by non-effects – such findings
can clearly be attributed to ideomotor processing, because they
show that perceptual effect representations play a role in action
selection.
There is, however, also plenty of evidence for visuomotor prim-
ing where the relation between stimulus and response is not one
of effect but one of affordance. In such instances, the stimulus is
not a typical effect of the action, but usually rather precedes the
action in the sense of affording it. For example, the task-irrelevant
side of a handle on a cup primes the ipsilateral response hand (Fis-
cher and Dahl, 2007; Bub and Masson, 2010; Goslin et al., 2012).
These kinds of visuomotor priming effects can also be explained
by associative learning accounts (Heyes, 2001) instead of ideomo-
tor theory, without assuming any perceptual processing in action
selection. In some visuomotor priming studies it is fully apparent,
whether the compatibility between stimulus and response rests on
the stimulus typically being an external imperative cause of the
response (affordance priming), or whether it rests on the stimu-
lus typically being an external effect of the response (ideomotor
priming).
For many other visuomotor studies, it is, however, unclear
whether the relation between stimulus and response is one
of affordance or one of effect. This has led to controversies
about the appropriate interpretation of visuomotor effects with
affordance/effect-ambiguous stimulus-response pairs.
For example, it has been debated whether visuomotor priming
for biological motion stimuli, sometimes referred to as “imitation
priming,” is owed to associative learning (Heyes, 2001, 2003; Heyes
and Ray, 2004; Bird and Heyes, 2005; Heyes et al., 2005; Wiggett
et al., 2011) or to ideomotor principles (Brass et al., 2000; Stürmer
et al., 2000), because in imitation a compatible stimulus can be an
affordance cue from the perspective of the imitator and an effect
from the perspective of the model (see, however, Leighton et al.,
2010, for an integrative view). A similar interpretation ambiguity
pertains for the Simon effect – a priming effect from irrelevant
stimulus laterality on ipsilateral responses (Proctor and Vu, 2006).
On the one hand, actions are often afforded by ipsilateral stimuli
(Michaels and Stins, 1997), but, on the other hand, they equally
often have ipsilateral effects (Greenwald and Shulman, 1973).
This issue is of particular importance for the interpretation
of motorvisual priming paradigms, because for many types of S2
stimuli commonly applied in these paradigms, it is not apparent
whether they are compatible with R1 in an affordance sense or in an
effect sense. If, however, the designer of a motorvisual experiment
with affordance/effect-ambiguous stimuli can make sure that the
experiment really demonstrates an influence of action processing
on perceptual processing, then this effect can definitely be ascribed
to ideomotor processing, despite the ambiguity of the stimuli. The
just described alternative non-ideomotor explanations for visuo-
motor priming with affordance/effect-ambiguous stimuli do not
apply to motorvisual paradigms. These non-ideomotor accounts
can easily explain why perceptions that usually trigger certain
responses prime these responses, but they cannot explain why
these responses should prime perceptions which usually trigger
them. Thus, motorvisual paradigms are, for theoretical reasons,
superior to visuomotor paradigms with regard to the investiga-
tion of ideomotor processing with rather ambiguous stimuli. This
is an important advantage, because there are few stimuli which
can be classified without doubt as effect, and not as affordance,
of a response, unless they are associated with the response in a
pre-experimental learning phase (as, e.g., in Cardoso-Leite et al.,
2010; Pfister et al., 2012).
As mentioned above, however, this advantage is only realized
when the experimental design of a motorvisual priming study
does not allow an alternative visuomotor explanation. For some
motorvisual priming studies this is not the case. When these
studies apply affordance/effect-ambiguous stimuli, they cannot be
definitively regarded as informative about ideomotor processing.
This applies in particular to motorvisual single task paradigms and
to concurrent motorvisual dual task paradigms. I will discuss each
in turn.
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Single tasks
For both affordance/effect-ambiguous stimulus classes discussed
above (lateral stimuli and human movement stimuli), single tasks
have been interpreted as evidence for motorvisual effects. Van der
Lubbe and colleagues (Van der Lubbe and Abrahamse, 2011; Van
der Lubbe et al., 2012), for example, have suggested a framework
that explains the standard Simon effect in terms of motorvisual
effects (see also Metzker and Dreisbach, 2009, 2011; Nishimura
and Yokosawa, 2010b), and Stürmer et al. (2000) and Craighero
et al. (2002) have interpreted imitation priming in terms of the
ideomotor theory.
Craighero et al. (2002), for instance, primed stimulus percep-
tion by the preparation of compatible or incompatible grasping
movements. The secondary response was the speeded execu-
tion of the previously prepared movement. They explained the
effect as the effects of motor preparation on stimulus percep-
tion. The effect could also be interpreted, however, as an effect
of stimulus perception on response execution, as Grosjean and
Mordkoff (2001), Vogt et al. (2003) and Miall et al. (2006) have
pointed out.
A strategy to avoid this interpretation ambiguity has been
applied by Lindemann and Bekkering (2009). They investigated
motorvisual effects by a series of single tasks, and protected
the effects against visuomotor explanations with an additional
motorvisual dual task.
Concurrent dual tasks
An alternative visuomotor explanation for motorvisual dual tasks
is only possible when stimulus and response are cyclic, temporally
extended, events (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2004; Schubö et al., 2004;
Jacobs and Shiffrar, 2005; Miall et al., 2006; Zwickel et al., 2010b).
From now on, I will refer to such tasks by the term concurrent
motorvisual task.
Concurrent motorvisual priming effects are behaviorally indis-
tinguishable from visuomotor effects. Several previous studies
have shown that it is more difficult to perform compatible
cyclic movements in synchrony with compatible stimulation than
incompatible stimulation (Kilner et al., 2003; Bouquet et al., 2011;
Capa et al., 2011; Press, 2011; Gowen and Poliakoff, 2012). This
means that the difficulty of the motor task differs between com-
patible and incompatible trials in concurrent motorvisual priming
studies. In compatible trials, the motor task is more difficult.
Performing a more demanding task might lead to an unspecific
impairment of general perceptual performance in incompatible
trials. Unspecific means that the impairment is per se indepen-
dent of the action’s compatibility with the perceptual event, but
would affect perception of any stimulus (see Müsseler and Wühr,
2002, for an analysis of specific and unspecific motorvisual inter-
ference). Unspecific motorvisual priming effects have often been
demonstrated in dual tasks, where R1-S2 compatibility was either
not manipulated or additive to unspecific impairment (Band et al.,
2006; Johnston and McCann, 2006; Brisson and Jolicœur, 2007).
Unspecific motorvisual impairment can, however, not be regarded
as clear evidence for ideomotor processing. It can also be explained
by limitations in either motor- or perceptually-related processes
alone, such as transfer of information to visual short-term memory
(Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua, 1998), or response selection (Pashler,
1994; Marois et al., 2006), owing to limited general process-
ing capacities. Motorvisual evidence for the ideomotor theory
requires that actions impair perception in a content-sensitive,
compatibility-selective, manner, because only this shows that spe-
cific perceptual effect representations are processed in action
planning.
The best strategy to ensure that a motorvisual priming effect
can be explained by compatibility-specific motorvisual impair-
ment, instead of a combination of compatibility-specific visuomo-
tor impairment and unspecific motorvisual impairment, would be
to have the S2 stimulus temporally follow the R1 response (e.g.,
Oriet et al., 2003b).
CONCLUSION
Although motorvisual priming studies are a powerful tool for
investigating perceptual processing in motor cognition, they are
sometimes susceptible to alternative explanations. This expla-
nation ambiguity stems from the requirement to manipulate
responses indirectly as independent variables, and to measure per-
ceptual processes indirectly as the dependent variable. Alternative
explanations can be excluded however, by using dual tasks, where
response and stimulus do not temporally overlap, and where S1-R1
mapping is defined on another dimension as R1-S2 compatibility.
DIRECTIONS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
Although previous motorvisual priming studies have substan-
tially extended our knowledge about ideomotor processing, many
questions about perceptual processing in action planning are still
unanswered, and there is enormous potential for future motorvi-
sual priming research. In the following subsections I sketch some
of the most urgent ideomotor issues that could be solved by
motorvisual priming research.
THE FUNCTION OF BINDING
Motorvisual priming research has shown that perceptual features
are bound into action plans, and are, consequently, not fully acces-
sible to concurrent perceptual processes. The function of this
binding process is, however, not clear yet. Some have suggested that
binding of the perceptual effect representations keeps these repre-
sentations from triggering the same action redundantly again and
again by ideomotor mechanisms. In that case, execution would
be blocked by a repetitive chain of triggering the same action
(e.g., Müsseler, 1999). According to this account, the function
of effect-binding would be the inhibition of outgoing activation
from the perceptual effect representations toward other motor
processes. Thus, the perceptual impairment would be merely a
perceptual side-effect of inhibiting representations to shield them
from actions.
Koch and Prinz (2002) suggested an account of effect-binding,
which presents motorvisual impairment not as a side-effect but as
the main function of binding. They say that “. . . the code subserv-
ing response execution is shielded against interference from visual
input, which then leads to an impairment in perceiving compati-
ble stimuli” (Koch and Prinz, 2002, p. 200). According to this view,
R1 production is shielded against any interference from irrelevant
visual information which might affect it. S2 is task-irrelevant for
R1 production, but would be a potential ideomotor-trigger in R1-
S2 compatible trials. Thus, shielding is particularly important in
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compatible trials and would produce the motorvisual impairment
effect.
There is preliminary evidence for both accounts. The finding
that binding can also affect compatible responses in dual tasks (e.g.,
Mattson and Fournier, 2008; Eder et al., 2012), rather supports
the proposal that the function of binding is to avoid redundant
repetitive response planning.
Support for the shielding account comes from studies on the
modulation of shielding processes. According to Dreisbach (2012)
the process of shielding responses against interference from irrel-
evant stimuli does depend strongly on the task set applied, that
is, on how the response is cued. When it is a simple arbitrary
S-R mapping, such shielding is virtually absent, whereas a con-
stant (Dreisbach and Wenke, 2011) and rule-based (Dreisbach and
Haider, 2008, 2009) mapping leads to substantial shielding effects.
This pattern is indeed also reflected in motorvisual impairment.
Thomaschke et al. (2012b) and Wühr and Müsseler (2002) inves-
tigated the role of different S1-R1 mapping rules on a motorvisual
impairment effect. Both studies compared motorvisual (R1-S2)
impairment effects under compatible S1-R1 mapping rules with
impairment effects under incompatible S1-R1 mapping rules. R1
were lateral key presses, and S2 were left/right pointing arrow
heads. Both studies found the same pattern: when S1-R1 map-
ping was performed according to a simple, compatible mapping
rule a substantial impairment effect was found, but the effect was
absent when S1-R1 mapping required memorizing incompatible
S1-R1 translations.
A definitive decision would require further research, in partic-
ular a more systematic investigation of the role of S1-R1 mapping
rules in motorvisual priming.
S2 MODALITY IN MOTOR-PERCEPTUAL PRIMING
The motorvisual priming studies reviewed in this article were
restricted to the visual domain. The ideomotor theory claims,how-
ever, that sensory effects in any modality can trigger actions. Previ-
ous action-perception studies have rarely applied other modalities
(see Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
An interesting question for further research would be whether
the temporal patterns found in motorvisual priming studies also
obtain for motor-auditive or motor-tactile priming, or whether
effect representations in different modalities are differentially
involved in ideomotor cognition.
Another interesting issue is related to the interplay between
different modalities. Research on multisensory interactions has
shown that perceptual representations in one modality are tightly
coupled to perceptions on other modalities when they frequently
co-occur (Driver and Spence, 2000; Craig, 2006; Butz et al., 2010).
Proponents of the ideomotor theory have often suggested that the
perceptual representations involved in action selection are of a
multisensory nature (e.g., Hommel, 2004).
This raises the question whether actions can also be indi-
rectly triggered by, for example, auditory perceptual representa-
tion, when this representation is not a typical effect of the action
but often co-occurs with its visual effects. This question could be
answered by motor-perceptual priming. In particular, one would
have to associate, in a learning phase, an action with an audi-
tory effect that is compatible with a certain visual sensation, such
as high-pitched tones with stimuli in the right visual field (see,
e.g., Rusconi et al., 2006; Nishimura and Yokosawa, 2009; Eitan
and Timmers, 2010). If this action, in a later dual task test phase,
impaired perceptions in the other modality one could infer that
ideomotor representations are multisensory.
R1 TYPE IN MOTORVISUAL PRIMING
The motorvisual priming studies reviewed in the present paper
have been restricted to manual or verbal R1 responses, because
these were predominant in the ideomotor-inspired literature on
motorvisual effects.
A further well-researched motorvisual phenomenon is, how-
ever, the influence of eye movement planning on visual attention.
Eye movements are very tightly coupled with vision, because they
almost always have direct effects on visual input. It has long been
known that the planning and execution of eye movements have a
major impact on visual attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1987; Atabaki
et al., 2009; Land and Tatler, 2009). The effects of eye movements
on the perception of compatible stimuli can be facilitative (Shep-
herd et al., 1986; Sheliga et al., 1994; Hoffman and Subramaniam,
1995; Kowler et al., 1995; Smith et al., 2004), but also detrimen-
tal (Tibber et al., 2009). There is, however, already evidence from
comparative studies that eye movements have qualitatively differ-
ent effects on perception from manual movements (Fischer et al.,
1999, 2003; Deubel and Schneider, 2003). It is an important task
for future research to determine whether eye movements can be
explained at least in part by ideomotor processes (see Herwig and
Horstmann,2011; Huestegge and Kreutzfeldt,2012, for initial steps
in this direction), and, if such an explanation is possible, why do
ideomotor processes lead to different behavioral effects for eye and
hand movements?
CONCLUSION
Previous research on ideomotor processing has shown that action
planning binds perceptual representations into a stable compound
representation of the action. It is, however, still unclear which cog-
nitive function this binding fulfills. Other open questions are the
degree to which ideomotor representations are multisensory, and
which types of actions employ ideomotor processing. These issues
can potentially be solved by future motorvisual priming studies.
REFERENCES
Atabaki, A., Ignashchenkova, A., Kam-
phuis, S., and Thier, P. (2009).
Towards the neural basis of spa-
tial attention: studies in monkey
and man. Neuro-ophthalmology 33,
132–141.
Band, G. P. H., Jolicœur, P., Akyürek,
E. G., and Memelink, J. (2006).
Integrative views on dual-task
costs. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 18,
481–492.
Beets, I. A. M., Rösler, F., and Fiehler,
K. (2010). Nonvisual motor learning
improves visual motion perception:
evidence from violating the two-
thirds power law. J. Neurophysiol.
104, 1612–1624.
Bird, G., and Heyes, C. (2005). Effector-
dependent learning by observation
of a finger movement sequence. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
31, 262–275.
Bompas, A., and O’Regan, J. K. (2006).
Evidence for a role of action in
colour perception. Perception 35,
65–78.
Bonfiglioli, C., Duncan, J., Rorden,
C., and Kennett, S. (2002). Action
and perception: evidence against
converging selection processes. Vis.
Cogn. 9, 458–476.
Bortoletto, M., Mattingley, J. B., and
Cunnington, R. (2011). Action
intentions modulate visual process-
ing during action perception. Neu-
ropsychologia 49, 2097–2104.
Bouquet, C. A., Shipley, T. F., Capa,
R. L., and Marshall, P. J. (2011).
Motor contagion: goal-directed
www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 519 | 11
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomaschke Ideomotor cognition and motorvisual priming
actions are more contagious than
non-goal-directed actions. Exp. Psy-
chol. 58, 71–78.
Boyer, T. W., Longo, M. R., and Berten-
thal, B. I. (2012). Is automatic imita-
tion a specialized form of stimulus-
response compatibility? Dissociating
imitative and spatial compatibilities.
Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 139, 440–448.
Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Wohlschläger,
A., and Prinz, W. (2000). Compat-
ibility between observed and exe-
cuted finger movements: comparing
symbolic, spatial, and imitative cues.
Brain Cogn. 44, 124–143.
Brisson, B., and Jolicœur, P. (2007).
Early crossmodal multitasking inter-
ference revealed by event-related
potentials. Vis. Cogn. 15, 77–80.
Bub, D. N., and Masson, M. E. J. (2010).
Grasping beer mugs: on the dynam-
ics of alignment effects induced
by handled objects. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 36, 341–358.
Bubic, A., von Cramon, D. Y., and
Schubotz, R. I. (2010). Predic-
tion, cognition and the brain.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:25.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00025
Butz, M. V., Thomaschke, R., Lin-
hardt, M. J., and Herbort, O. (2010).
Remapping motion across modali-
ties: tactile rotations influence visual
motion judgments. Exp. Brain Res.
207, 1–11.
Caessens, B., and Vandierendonck, A.
(2002). Inhibition and blindness to
response-compatible stimuli: a reap-
praisal. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 111,
45–57.
Calvo-Merino, B., Glaser, D. E., Grezes,
J., Passingham, R. E., and Haggard,
P. (2005). Action observation and
acquired motor skills: an fMRI study
with expert dancers. Cereb. Cortex
15, 1243–1249.
Cañal-Bruland, R., Kreinbucher, C., and
Oudejans, R. R. D. (2012). Motor
expertise influences strike and ball
judgements in baseball. Int. J. Sport
Psychol. 43, 137–152.
Capa, R. L., Marshall, P. J., Shipley,
T. F., Salesse, R. N., and Bouquet,
C. A. (2011). Does motor interfer-
ence arise from mirror system acti-
vation? The effect of prior visuo-
motor practice on automatic imita-
tion. Psychol. Res. 75, 152–157.
Cardoso-Leite, P., Mamassian, P.,
Schütz-Bosbach, S., and Waszak, F.
(2010). A new look at sensory atten-
uation: action-effect anticipation
affects sensitivity, not response bias.
Psychol. Sci. 21, 1740–1745.
Casile, A., and Giese, M. A. (2006).
Nonvisual motor training influences
biological motion perception. Curr.
Biol. 16, 69–74.
Catmur, C., and Heyes, C. (2011). Time
course analyses confirm indepen-
dence of imitative and spatial com-
patibility. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Per-
cept. Perform. 37, 409–421.
Christensen, A., Ilg, W., and Giese, M.
A. (2011). Spatiotemporal tuning of
the facilitation of biological motion
perception by concurrent motor exe-
cution. J. Neurosci. 31, 3493–3499.
Collins, T., Schicke, T., and Röder, B.
(2008). Action goal selection and
motor planning can be dissociated
by tool use. Cognition 109, 363–371.
Colzato, L. S., Warren, M. J., and Hom-
mel, B. (2006). Priming and binding
in and across perception and action:
a correlational analysis of the inter-
nal structure of event files. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 59, 1785–1804.
Craig, C. M., Goulon, C., Berton, E.,
Rao, G., Fernandez, L., and Bootsma,
R. J. (2009). Optic variables used
to judge future ball arrival position
in expert and novice soccer play-
ers. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 71,
515–522.
Craig, J. C. (2006). Visual motion inter-
feres with tactile motion perception.
Perception 35, 351–367.
Craighero, L., Bello, A., Fadiga, L., and
Rizzolatti, G. (2002). Hand action
preparation influences the responses
to hand pictures. Neuropsychologia
40, 492–502.
Craighero, L., Fadiga, L., Rizzolatti, G.,
and Umilta, C. (1999). Action for
perception: a motor-visual atten-
tional effect. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 25, 1673–1692.
De Maeght, S., and Prinz, W. (2004).
Action induction through action
observation. Psychol. Res. 68,
97–114.
Deubel, H., and Schneider,W. X. (2003).
Delayed saccades, but not delayed
manual aiming movements, require
visual attention shifts. Ann. N. Y.
Acad. Sci. 1004, 289–296.
Deubel, H., and Schneider,W. X. (2004).
“Attentional selection in sequen-
tial manual movements, movements
around an obstacle and in grasping,”
in Attention in Action: Advances from
Cognitive Neuroscience, eds G. W.
Humphreys and J. Riddoch (Hove:
Psychology Press), 69–90.
Deubel, H., Schneider, W. X., and
Paprotta, I. (1998). Selective dorsal
and ventral processing: evidence for
a common attentional mechanism in
reaching and perception. Vis. Cogn.
5, 81–107.
Diersch, N., Cross, E. S., Stadler, W.,
Schütz-Bosbach, S., and Rieger, M.
(2012). Representing others’ actions:
the role of expertise in the aging
mind. Psychol. Res. 76, 525–541.
Dreisbach, G. (2012). Mechanisms of
cognitive control: the functional role
of task rules. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.
21, 227–231.
Dreisbach, G., and Haider, H. (2008).
That’s what task sets are for: shield-
ing against irrelevant information.
Psychol. Res. 72, 355–361.
Dreisbach, G., and Haider, H. (2009).
How task representations guide
attention: further evidence for the
shielding function of task sets. J.
Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 35,
477–486.
Dreisbach, G., and Wenke, D. (2011).
The shielding function of task sets
and its relaxation during task switch-
ing. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem.
Cogn. 37, 1540–1546.
Driver, J., and Spence, C. (2000). Mul-
tisensory perception: beyond mod-
ularity and convergence. Curr. Biol.
10, R731–R735.
Eder, A. B., and Klauer, K. C. (2007).
Common valence coding in action
and evaluation: affective blindness
towards response-compatible stim-
uli. Cogn. Emot. 21, 1297–1322.
Eder, A. B., and Klauer, K. C.
(2009). A common-coding account
of the bidirectional evaluation-
behavior link. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
138, 218–235.
Eder, A. B., Müsseler, J., and Hommel,
B. (2012). The structure of affec-
tive action representation: temporal
binding of affective response codes.
Psychol. Res. 76, 111–118.
Eitan, Z., and Timmers, R. (2010).
Beethoven’s last piano sonata and
those who follow crocodiles: cross-
domain mappings of auditory pitch
in a musical context. Cognition 114,
405–422.
Elliott, D., Helsen, W. F., and Chua, R.
(2001). A century later: woodworth’s
(1899) two-component model of
goal-directed aiming. Psychol. Bull.
127, 342–357.
Elsner, B., and Hommel, B. (2001).
Effect anticipation and action con-
trol. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 27, 29–240.
Elsner, B., and Hommel, B. (2004). Con-
tiguity and contingency in action-
effect learning. Psychol. Res. 68,
138–154.
Engel, A., Burke, M., Fiehler, K., Bien,
S., and Rösler, F. (2008a). Motor
learning affects neural processing of
visual perception. Int. J. Psychol. 43,
450–451.
Engel, A., Burke, M., Fiehler, K., Bien, S.,
and Rösler, F. (2008b). Motor learn-
ing affects visual movement percep-
tion. Eur. J. Neurosci. 27, 2294–2302.
Fagioli, S., Ferlazzo, F., and Hommel,
B. (2007a). Controlling attention
through action: observing actions
primes action-related stimulus
dimensions. Neuropsychologia 45,
3351–3355.
Fagioli, S., Hommel, B., and Schubotz,
R. I. (2007b). Intentional control
of attention: action planning primes
action-related stimulus dimensions.
Psychol. Res. 71, 22–29.
Fischer, M. H. (1997). Attention allo-
cation during manual movement
preparation and execution. Eur. J.
Cogn. Psychol. 9, 17–51.
Fischer, M. H., and Dahl, C. D. (2007).
The time course of visuo-motor
affordances. Exp. Brain Res. 176,
519–524.
Fischer, M. H., Deubel, H.,
Wohlschläger, A., and Schneider,
W. X. (1999). Visuomotor mental
rotation of saccade direction. Exp.
Brain Res. 127, 224–232.
Fischer, M. H., and Hoellen, N. (2004).
Space- and object-based attention
depend on motor intention. J. Gen.
Psychol. 131, 365–377.
Fischer, M. H., Pratt, J., and Adam, J. J.
(2007). On the timing of reference
frames for action control. Exp. Brain
Res. 183, 127–132.
Fischer, M. H., Pratt, J., and Neggers,
S. F. W. (2003). Inhibition of return
and manual pointing movements.
Percept. Psychophys. 65, 379–387.
Gherri, E., and Eimer, M. (2010). Man-
ual response preparation disrupts
spatial attention: an electrophysio-
logical investigation of links between
action and attention. Neuropsycholo-
gia 48, 961–969.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The Ecological
Approach to Visual Perception. Hills-
dale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Glenberg, A. M., Lopez-Mobilia, G.,
McBeath, M., Toma, M., Sato, M.,
and Cattaneo, L. (2010). Know-
ing beans: human mirror mecha-
nisms revealed through motor adap-
tation. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:206.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00206
Glover, S. (2002). Visual illusions
affect planning but not control.
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 6,
288–292.
Glover, S. (2004). Separate visual repre-
sentations in the planning and con-
trol of action. Behav. Brain Sci. 27,
3–24.
Glover, S., and Dixon, P. (2002). Seman-
tics affect the planning but not con-
trol of grasping. Exp. Brain Res. 146,
383–387.
Glover, S., Wall, M. B., and Smith,
A. T. (2012). Distinct cortical net-
works support the planning and
online control of reaching-to-grasp
in humans. Eur. J. Neurosci. 35,
909–915.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 519 | 12
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomaschke Ideomotor cognition and motorvisual priming
Goslin, J., Dixon, T., Fischer, M. H.,
Cangelosi, A., and Ellis, R. (2012).
Electrophysiological examination of
embodiment in vision and action.
Psychol. Sci. 23, 152–157.
Gosselin-Kessiby, N., Messier, J., and
Kalaska, J. F. (2008). Evidence
for automatic on-line adjustments
of hand orientation during nat-
ural reaching movements to sta-
tionary targets. J. Neurophysiol. 99,
1653–1671.
Gowen, E., and Poliakoff, E. (2012).
How does visuomotor priming dif-
fer for biological and non-biological
stimuli? A review of the evidence.
Psychol. Res. 76, 407–420.
Graf, M., Reitzner, B., Corves, C.,
Casile, A., Giese, M., and Prinz,
W. (2007). Predicting point-light
actions in real-time. Neuroimage 36,
T22–T32.
Greenwald, A. G., and Shulman, H. G.
(1973). On doing two things at once:
II elimination of the psychologi-
cal refractory period effect. J. Exp.
Psychol. 101, 70–76.
Grosjean,M.,and Mordkoff, J. T. (2001).
On the influence of motor prepara-
tion on perceptual processing. J. Vis.
1, 139.
Häberle, A., Schütz-Bosbach, S.,
Laboissiere, R., and Prinz, W.
(2008). Ideomotor action in cooper-
ative and competitive settings. Soc.
Neurosci. 3, 26–36.
Hamilton, A., Wolpert, D., and Frith, U.
(2004). Your own action influences
how you perceive another person’s
action. Curr. Biol. 14, 493–498.
Hecht, H.,Vogt, S., and Prinz,W. (2001).
Motor learning enhances percep-
tual judgment: a case for action-
perception transfer. Psychol. Res. 65,
3–14.
Herwig, A., and Horstmann, G. (2011).
Action-effect associations revealed
by eye movements. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 18, 531–537.
Herwig, A., Prinz, W., and Waszak, F.
(2007). Two modes of sensorimotor
integration in intention-based and
stimulus-based actions. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 60, 1540–1554.
Herwig, A., and Waszak, F. (2009).
Intention and attention in ideomo-
tor learning. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 62,
219–227.
Hesse, C., and Deubel, H. (2011). Effi-
cient grasping requires attentional
resources. Vision Res. 51, 1223–1231.
Hesse, C., and Franz, V. H. (2009). Cor-
rective processes in grasping after
perturbations of object size. J. Mot.
Behav. 41, 253–273.
Heyes, C. (2001). Causes and conse-
quences of imitation. Trends Cogn.
Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 5, 253–261.
Heyes, C. (2003). Four routes of cog-
nitive evolution. Psychol. Rev. 110,
713–727.
Heyes, C. (2011). Automatic imitation.
Psychol. Bull. 137, 463–483.
Heyes, C., Bird, G., Johnson, H.,
and Haggard, P. (2005). Experi-
ence modulates automatic imita-
tion. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 22,
233–240.
Heyes, C., and Ray, E. (2004). Spatial
S-R compatibility effects in an inten-
tional imitation task. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 11, 703–708.
Hoffman, J. E., and Subramaniam, B.
(1995). The role of visual attention
in saccadic eye movements. Percept.
Psychophys. 57, 787–795.
Hoffmann, J., Lenhard, A., Sebald, A.,
and Pfister, R. (2009). Movements
or targets: what makes an action
in action-effect learning? Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 62, 2433–2449.
Hoffmann, J., Sebald, A., and Stöcker,
C. (2001). Irrelevant response effects
improve serial learning in serial reac-
tion time tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn.
Mem. Cogn. 27, 470–482.
Hohmann, T., Troje, N. F., Olmos,
A., and Munzert, J. (2011). The
influence of motor expertise and
motor experience on action and
actor recognition. J. Cogn. Psychol.
(Hove) 23, 403–415.
Hommel, B. (2004). Event files: feature
binding in and across perception and
action. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.)
8, 494–500.
Hommel, B. (2005). Perception in
action: multiple roles of sensory
information in action control. Cogn.
Process. 6, 3–14.
Hommel, B. (2007). Feature integration
across perception and action: event
files affect response choice. Psychol.
Res. 71, 42–63.
Hommel, B. (2009). Action control
according to TEC (theory of event
coding). Psychol. Res. 73, 512–526.
Hommel, B. (2010). “Grounding atten-
tion in action control: the inten-
tional control of selection,” in Effort-
less Attention: A New Perspective in
the Cognitive Science of Attention and
Action, ed. B. J. Bruya (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press), 121–140.
Hommel, B., Alonso, D., and Fuentes,
L. J. (2003). Acquisition and gener-
alization of action effects. Vis. Cogn.
10, 965–986.
Hommel, B., and Müsseler, J. (2006).
Action-feature integration blinds
to feature-overlapping perceptual
events: evidence from manual and
vocal actions. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 59,
509–523.
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben,
G., and Prinz, W. (2001). The theory
of event coding (TEC): a framework
for perception and action planning.
Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 849–937.
Hommel, B., and Schneider, W. X.
(2002). Visual attention and manual
response selection: distinct mecha-
nisms operating on the same codes.
Vis. Cogn. 9, 392–420.
Huestegge, L., and Kreutzfeldt, M.
(2012). Action effects in saccade
control. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 19,
198–203.
Hughes, G., Desantis, A., and Waszak, F.
(2012). Mechanisms on intentional
binding and sensory attenuation: the
role of temporal prediction, tem-
poral control, identity prediction,
and motor prediction. Psychol. Bull.
doi:10.1037/a0028566
Jacobs, A., and Shiffrar, M. (2005).
Walking perception by walking
observers. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Per-
cept. Perform. 31, 157–169.
James, K. H., and Gauthier, I. (2009).
When writing impairs reading: letter
perception’s susceptibility to motor
interference. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
138, 416–431.
Janczyk, M., Pfister, R., Crognale, M.
A., and Kunde, W. (2012). Effective
rotations: action effects determine
the interplay of mental and manual
rotations. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 141,
489–501.
Janczyk, M., Skirde, S., Weigelt, M., and
Kunde, W. (2009). Visual and tactile
action effects determine bimanual
coordination performance. Hum.
Mov. Sci. 28, 437–449.
Johnston, J. C., and McCann, R. S.
(2006). On the locus of dual-task
interference: is there a bottleneck at
the stimulus classification stage? Q.
J. Exp. Psychol. 59, 694–719.
Jolicœur, P., and Dell’Acqua, R. (1998).
Demonstration of short-term
consolidation. Cogn. Psychol. 36,
138–202.
Kemmerer, D., and Tranel, D. (2000).
A double dissociation between lin-
guistic and perceptual representa-
tions of spatial relationships. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 17, 393–414.
Keulen, R. F., Adam, J. J., Fischer, M.
H., Kuipers, H., and Jolles, J. (2004).
Selective reaching: distracter effects
on movement kinematics as a func-
tion of target-distracter separation.
J. Gen. Psychol. 131, 345–363.
Kilner, J. M., Paulignan, Y., and Blake-
more, S. J. (2003). An interfer-
ence effect of observed biological
movement on action. Curr. Biol. 13,
522–525.
Knuf, L., Aschersleben, G., and Prinz,
W. (2001). An analysis of ideomo-
tor action. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 130,
779–798.
Koch, I. (2009). The role of crosstalk
in dual-task performance: evidence
from manipulating response-code
overlap. Psychol. Res. 73, 417–424.
Koch, I., and Kunde, W. (2002). Verbal
response-effect compatibility. Mem.
Cognit. 30, 1297–1303.
Koch, I., Metin, B., and Schuch, S.
(2003). The role of temporal unpre-
dictability for process interference
and code overlap in perception-
action dual tasks. Psychol. Res. 67,
244–252
Koch, I., and Prinz, W. (2002). Process
interference and code overlap in
dual-task performance. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 28,
192–201.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1987). Seeing and imag-
ing in the cerebral hemispheres:
a computational approach. Psychol.
Rev. 94, 148–175.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994). Image and Brain:
The Resolution of the Imagery Debate.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kosslyn, S. M. (2006). You can play
20 questions with nature and win:
categorical versus coordinate spatial
relations as a case study. Neuropsy-
chologia 44, 1519–1523.
Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Gitel-
man, D. R., and Alpert, N. M. (1998).
Neural systems that encode categor-
ical versus coordinate spatial rela-
tions: PET investigations. Psychobi-
ology 26, 333–347.
Kowler, E., Anderson, E., Dosher, B.,
and Blaser, E. (1995). The role of
attention in the programming of
saccades. Vision Res. 35, 1897–1916.
Kray, J., Eenshuistra, R., Kerstner, H.,
Weidema, M., and Hommel, B.
(2006). Language and action con-
trol: the acquisition of action goals
in early childhood. Psychol. Sci. 17,
737–741.
Kunde, W. (2001). Response-effect
compatibility in manual choice reac-
tion tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 27, 387–394.
Kunde, W. (2003). Temporal response-
effect compatibility. Psychol. Res. 67,
153–159.
Kunde, W. (2004). Response priming by
supraliminal and subliminal action
effects. Psychol. Res. 68, 91–96.
Kunde, W., Elsner, B., and Kiesel, A.
(2007). No anticipation-no action:
the role of anticipation in action
and perception. Cogn. Process. 8,
71–78.
Kunde, W., and Wühr, P. (2004). Actions
blind to conceptually overlapping
stimuli. Psychol. Res. 68, 199–207.
Land, M. F., and Tatler, B. W. (2009).
Looking and Acting: Vision and Eye
Movements in Natural Behaviour.
Oxford: University Press.
www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 519 | 13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomaschke Ideomotor cognition and motorvisual priming
Leighton, J., Bird, G., and Heyes, C.
(2010). “Goals” are not an integral
component of imitation. Cognition
114, 423–435.
Lindemann, O., and Bekkering, H.
(2009). Object manipulation and
motion perception: evidence of
an Influence of action planning
on visual processing. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 35,
1062–1071.
Linnell, K. J., Humphreys, G. W., McIn-
tyre, D. B., Laitinen, S., and Wing,
A. M. (2005). Action modulates
object-based selection. Vision Res.
45, 2268–2286.
Liu, G., Chua, R., and Enns, J. T. (2008).
Attention for perception and action:
task interference for action planning,
but not for online control. Exp. Brain
Res. 185, 709–717.
Logan, G. D. (1995). Linguistic and
conceptual control of visual spa-
tial attention. Cogn. Psychol. 28,
103–174.
Marois, R., Larson, J. M., Chun, M.
M., and Shima, D. (2006). Response-
specific sources of dual-task inter-
ference in human pre-motor cortex.
Psychol. Res. 70, 436–447.
Martel, L., Bidet-Ildei, C., and Coello,
Y. (2011). Anticipating the terminal
position of an observed action: effect
of kinematic, structural, and identity
information. Vis. Cogn. 19, 785–798.
Massen, C., and Prinz, W. (2009). Move-
ments, actions and tool-use actions:
an ideomotor approach to imitation.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 364,
2349–2358.
Mattson, P. S., and Fournier, L. R.
(2008). An action sequence held in
memory can interfere with response
selection of a target stimulus, but
does not interfere with response acti-
vation of noise stimuli. Mem. Cognit.
36, 1236–1247.
Memelink, J., and Hommel, B. (2012).
Intentional weighting: a basic princi-
ple in cognitive control. Psychol. Res.
doi:10.1007/s00426-012-0435-y
Metzker, M., and Dreisbach, G. (2009).
Bidirectional priming processes in
the Simon task. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 35, 1770–1783.
Metzker, M., and Dreisbach, G. (2011).
Priming processes in the Simon
task: evidence from the lexical
decision task for a third route
in the Simon effect. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 37,
892–902.
Miall, R. C., Stanley, J., Todhunter, S.,
Levick, C., Lindo, S., and Miall, J.
D. (2006). Performing hand actions
assists the visual discrimination of
similar hand postures. Neuropsy-
chologia 44, 966–976.
Michaels, C. F., and Stins, J. F. (1997).
“An ecological approach to stimulus-
response compatibility,” in Theo-
retical Issues in Stimulus-Response
Compatibility, eds B. Hommel and
W. Prinz (North Holland: Elsevier),
333–360.
Müsseler, J. (1999). “How independent
from action control is perception?
An event-coding account for more
equally-ranked crosstalks,” in Cogni-
tive Contributions to the Perception
of Spatial and Temporal Events, eds
G. Aschersleben, T. Bachmann, and
J. Müsseler (Amsterdam: Elsevier),
121–147.
Müsseler, J., and Hommel, B. (1997a).
Blindness to response-compatible
stimuli. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 23, 861–872.
Müsseler, J., and Hommel, B. (1997b).
Detecting and identifying response-
compatible stimuli. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 4, 125–129.
Müsseler, J., Steininger, S., and Wühr, P.
(2001). Can actions affect perceptual
processing? Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 54,
137–154.
Müsseler, J., and Wühr, P. (2002).
“Response-evoked interference in
visual encoding,” in Common Mech-
anisms in Perception and Action:
Attention and Performance IXI, eds
W. Prinz and B. Hommel (Oxford:
University Press), 520–537.
Müsseler, J., Wühr, P., Danielmeier,
C., and Zysset, S. (2005). Action-
induced blindness with lateralized
stimuli and responses. Exp. Brain
Res. 160, 214–222.
Müsseler, J., Wühr, P., and Prinz,
W. (2000). Varying the response
code in the blindness to response-
compatible stimuli. Vis. Cogn. 7,
743–767.
Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., and John-
son, B. W. (2007). A dual mech-
anism neural framework for social
understanding. Philos. Psychol. 20,
43–63.
Nattkemper, D., Ziessler, M., and Fren-
sch, P. A. (2010). Binding in volun-
tary action control. Neurosci. Biobe-
hav. Rev. 34, 1092–1101.
Nikolaev, A. R., Ziessler, M., Dimova, K.,
and van Leeuwen, C. (2008). Antici-
pated action consequences as a nexus
between action and perception: evi-
dence from event-related potentials.
Biol. Psychol. 78, 53–65.
Nishimura,A., and Yokosawa, K. (2009).
Effects of laterality and pitch height
of an auditory accessory stimulus
on horizontal response selection: the
Simon effect and the SMARC effect.
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 16, 666–670.
Nishimura, A., and Yokosawa, K.
(2010a). Effector identity and
orthogonal stimulus-response
compatibility in blindness to
response-compatible stimuli.
Psychol. Res. 74, 172–181.
Nishimura, A., and Yokosawa, K.
(2010b). Response-specifying cue
for action interferes with perception
of feature-sharing stimuli. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. (Hove) 63, 1150–1167.
Nissen, M. J., and Bullemer, P. (1987).
Attentional requirements of learn-
ing: evidence from performance
measures. Cogn. Psychol. 19, 1–32.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Oades, R. D., and Kreul, K. (2001).
Anomalous processing in schizo-
phrenia suggests adaptive event-
action coding requires multiple
executive brain mechanims. Behav.
Brain Sci. 24, 895–896.
Okubo, M., Laeng, B., Saneyoshi, A.,
and Michimata, C. (2010). Exoge-
nous attention differentially mod-
ulates the processing of categorical
and coordinate spatial relations. Acta
Psychol. (Amst.) 135, 1–11.
Oriet, C., Stevanovski, B., and Jolicœur,
P. (2003a). Congruency-induced
blindness: a cost-benefit analysis.
Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 112, 243–258.
Oriet, C., Stevanovski, B., Jolicœur, P.,
and Cowan, W. B. (2003b). Length-
ening the duration of response exe-
cution does not modulate blindness
to action-compatible stimuli. Can. J.
Exp. Psychol. 57, 11–22.
Oriet, C., Stevanovski, B., and Jolicœur,
P. (2007). Feature binding and
episodic retrieval in blindness for
congruent stimuli: evidnece from
analyses of sequential congruency.
Psychol. Res. 71, 30–41.
Paprotta, I., Deubel, H., and Schneider,
W. X. (1999). “Object recogni-
tion and goal-directed eye or
hand movements are coupled
by visual attention,” in Current
Oculomotor Research: Physiologi-
cal and Psychological Aspects, eds
W. Becker, H. Deubel, and T.
Mergner (New York, NY: Kluwer),
241–248.
Pashler, H. (1994). Dual-task interfer-
ence in simple tasks: data and theory.
Psychol. Bull. 116, 220–244.
Pfister, R., Heinemann, A., Kiesel, A.,
Thomaschke, R., and Janczyk, M.
(2012). Do endogenous and exoge-
nous action control compete for
perception? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 38, 279–284.
Pfister, R., and Janczyk, M. (2012).
Harleß’ apparatus of will: 150 years
later. Psychol. Res. 76, 561–565.
Pfister, R., Kiesel, A., and Hoff-
mann, J. (2011). Learning at any
rate: action-effect learning for
stimulus-based actions. Psychol. Res.
75, 61–65.
Pfister, R., Kiesel, A., and Melcher, T.
(2010). Adaptive control of ideomo-
tor effect anticipations. Acta Psychol.
(Amst.) 135, 316–322.
Prablanc, C., and Pélisson, D. (1990).
“Gaze saccade orienting and hand
pointing are locked to their goal
by quick internal loops,” in Atten-
tion and Performance, Vol. XIII, ed.
M. Jeannerod (Hillsdale: Erlbaum),
653–676.
Press, C. (2011). Action observation and
robotic agents: learning and anthro-
pomorphism. Neurosci. Biobehav.
Rev. 35, 1410–1418.
Press, C., Gherri, E., Heyes, C., and
Eimer, M. (2009). Action prepara-
tion helps and hinders perception
of action. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22,
2198–2211.
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action
planning. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 9,
129–154.
Prinz, W., de Maeght, S., and Knuf,
L. (2005). “Intention in action,” in
Attention in Action: Advances from
Cognitive Neuroscience, eds G. W.
Humphreys and M. J. Riddoch (Sus-
sex: Psychology Press), 93–107.
Proctor, R. W., and Vu, K. L.
(2006). Stimulus-Response Compat-
ibility Principles: Data, Theory, and
Application. Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press.
Rieger, M. (2007). Letters as visual
action-effects in skilled typing. Acta
Psychol. (Amst.) 126, 138–153.
Rizzolatti, G., Riggio, L., Dascola, I.,
and Umilta, C. (1987). Reorienting
attention across the horizontal and
vertical meridians: evidence in favor
of a premotor theory of attention.
Neuropsychologia 25, 31–40.
Rusconi, E., Kwan, B., Giordano, B.
L., Umiltà, C., and Butterworth,
B. (2006). Spatial representation of
pitch height: the SMARC effect. Cog-
nition 99, 113–129.
Saygin, A. P., and Stadler, W. (2012).
The role of appearance and motion
in action prediction. Psychol. Res. 76,
388–394.
Saygin, A. P., Wilson, S. M., Hagler,
D. J. Jr., Bates, E., and Sereno,
M. I. (2004). Point-light biological
motion perception activates human
premotor cortex. J. Neurosci. 24,
6181–6188.
Schmidt, R. A. (1975). A schema the-
ory of discrete motor skill learning.
Psychol. Rev. 82, 225–260.
Schubö, A., Aschersleben, G., and Prinz,
W. (2001). Interactions between per-
ception and action in a reaction task
with overlapping S-R assignments.
Psychol. Res. 65, 145–157.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 519 | 14
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomaschke Ideomotor cognition and motorvisual priming
Schubö, A., Prinz, W., and Aschersleben,
G. (2004). Perceiving while acting:
action affects perception. Psychol.
Res. 68, 208–215.
Schuch, S., and Koch, I. (2004). The
cost of changing the representation
of action: response repetition and
response-response compatibility in
dual tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 30, 566–582.
Schütz-Bosbach, S., and Prinz, W.
(2007). Perceptual resonance:
action-induced modulation of
perception. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul.
Ed.) 11, 349–355.
Sheliga, B. M., Riggio, L., and Rizzo-
latti, G. (1994). Orienting of atten-
tion and eye movements. Exp. Brain
Res. 98, 507–522.
Shepherd, M., Findlay, J. M., and
Hockey, R. J. (1986). The relation-
ship between eye movements and
spatial attention. Q. J. Exp. Psychol.
(Hove) 38, 475–491.
Shin, Y. K., Proctor, R. W., and Capaldi,
E. J. (2010). A review of contempo-
rary ideomotor theory. Psychol. Bull.
136, 943–974.
Smith, D. T., Rorden, C., and Jackson,
S. R. (2004). Exogenous orienting of
attention depends upon the ability to
execute eye movements. Curr. Biol.
14, 792–795.
Spiegel, M. A., Koester, D., Weigelt, M.,
and Schack, T. (2012). The costs of
changing an intended action: move-
ment planning, but not execution,
interferes with verbal working mem-
ory. Neurosci. Lett. 509, 82–86.
Springer, A., Brandstädter, S., Liepelt,
R., Birngruber, T., Giese, M., Mech-
sner, F., et al. (2011). Motor execu-
tion affects action prediction. Brain
Cogn. 76, 26–36.
Springer, A., Hamilton, A. F. D., and
Cross, E. S. (2012). Simulating and
predicting others’ actions. Psychol.
Res. 76, 383–387.
Stadler, W., Springer, A., Parkinson, J.,
and Prinz, W. (2012). Movement
kinematics affect action prediction:
comparing human to non-human
point-light actions. Psychol. Res. 76,
395–406.
Stevanovski, B., Oriet, C., and Jolicœur,
P. (2002). Blinded by headlights.
Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 56, 65–74.
Stock, A., and Stock, C. (2004). A short
history of ideomotor action. Psychol.
Res. 68, 176–188.
Stoet, G., and Hommel, B. (1999).
Action planning and the temporal
binding of response codes. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 25,
1625–1640.
Stürmer, B.,Aschersleben, G., and Prinz,
W. (2000). Correspondence effects
with manual gestures and pos-
tures: a study of imitation. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26,
1746–1759.
Symes, E., Ottoboni, G., Tucker, M.,
Ellis,R., and Tessari,A. (2010). When
motor attention improves selective
attention: the dissociating role of
saliency. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 63,
1387–1397.
Symes, E., Tucker, M., Ellis, R., Vainio,
L., and Ottoboni, G. (2008). Grasp
preparation improves change detec-
tion for congruent objects. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 34,
854–871.
Thomaschke, R., Hopkins, B., and Miall,
R. C. (2012a). The planning and
control model (PCM) of motorvi-
sual priming: reconciling motorvi-
sual impairment and facilitation
effects. Psychol. Rev. 119, 388–407.
Thomaschke, R., Hopkins, B., and Miall,
R. C. (2012b). The role of cue-
response mapping in motorvisual
impairment and facilitation: evi-
dence for different roles of action
planning and action control in
motorvisual dual-task priming. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
38, 336–349.
Tibber, M. S., Grant, S., and Morgan,
M. J. (2009). Oculomotor responses
and visuospatial perceptual judge-
ments compete for common limited
resources. J. Vis. 9, 1–13.
Tranel, D., and Kemmerer, D. (2004).
Neuroanatomical correlates of loca-
tive propositions. Cogn. Neuropsy-
chol. 21, 719–749.
van de Kamp, C., Bongers, R. M., and
Zaal, F. (2009). Effects of chang-
ing object size during prehension. J.
Mot. Behav. 41, 427–435.
van der Ham, I. J. M., and Borst,
G. (2011). The nature of categori-
cal and coordinate spatial relation
processing: an interference study. J.
Cogn. Psychol. (Hove) 23, 922–930.
van der Ham, I. J. M., and Postma,
A. (2010). Lateralization of spatial
categories: a comparison of ver-
bal and visuospatial categorical rela-
tions. Mem. Cognit. 38, 582–590.
Van der Lubbe, R. H. J., and Abra-
hamse, E. L. (2011). The premotor
theory of attention and the Simon
effect. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 136,
259–264.
Van der Lubbe, R. H. J., Abrahamse, E.
L., and De Kleine, E. (2012). The
premotor theory of attention as an
account for the Simon effect. Acta
Psychol. (Amst.) 140, 25–34.
Vogt, S., Taylor, P., and Hopkins, B.
(2003). Visuomotor priming by pic-
tures of hands: perspective matters.
Neuropsychologia 41, 941–951.
Vogt, S., and Thomaschke, R. (2007).
From visuo-motor interactions to
imitation learning: behavioural and
brain imaging studies. J. Sports Sci.
25, 497–517.
Waszak, F., Cardoso-Leite, P., and
Hughes, G. (2012). Action effect
anticipation: neurophysiological
basis and functional consequences.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 36, 943–959.
Watanabe, K. (2008). Behavioral speed
contagion: automatic modulation of
movement timing by observation
of body movements. Cognition 106,
1514–1524.
Wenke, D., and Frensch, P. A. (2005).
The influence of task instruction on
action coding: constraint setting or
direct coding? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 31, 803–819.
Wiediger, M. D., and Fournier, L. R.
(2008). An action sequence withheld
in memory can delay execution of
visually guided actions: the gener-
alization of response compatibility
interference. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 34, 1136–1149.
Wiggett, A. J., Hudson, M., Tipper, S. P.,
and Downing, P. E. (2011). Learn-
ing associations between action and
perception: effects of incompatible
training on body part and spatial
priming. Brain Cogn. 76, 87–96.
Wilson, M., and Knoblich, G. (2005).
The case for motor involvement
in perceiving conspecifics. Psychol.
Bull. 131, 460–473.
Wolpert, D. M., and Ghahramani, Z.
(2000). Computational principles of
movement neuroscience. Nat. Neu-
rosci. 3, 1212–1217.
Wolpert, D. M., Ghahramani, Z., and
Jordan, M. I. (1995). An internal
model for sensorimotor integration.
Science 269, 1880–1882.
Wolpert, D. M., Miall, R. C., and Kawato,
M. (1998). Internal models in the
cerebellum. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul.
Ed.) 2, 338–347.
Wühr, P., and Müsseler, J. (2001).
Time course of the blindness to
response-compatible stimuli. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 27,
1260–1270.
Wühr, P., and Müsseler, J. (2002).
Blindness to response-compatible
stimuli in the psychological refrac-
tory period paradigm. Vis. Cogn. 9,
421–457.
Wykowska, A., Hommel, B., and
Schubö, A. (2011). Action-induced
effects on perception depend nei-
ther on element-level nor on set-
level similarity between stimulus
and response sets. Atten. Percept.
Psychophys. 73, 1034–1041.
Wykowska, A., Hommel, B., and
Schubö, A. (2012). Imaging when
acting: picture but not word cues
induce action-related biases of visual
attention. Front. Psychol. 3:388.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00388
Wykowska, A., Schubö, A., and Hom-
mel, B. (2009). How you move is
what you see: action planning biases
selection in visual search. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 36,
1755–1769.
Ziessler, M. (1998). Response-effect
learning as a major component of
implicit serial learning. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 24, 962–978.
Ziessler, M., and Nattkemper, D. (2001).
Learning of event sequences is based
on response-effect learning: further
evidence from a serial reaction task.
J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn.
27, 595–613.
Ziessler, M., Nattkemper, D., and Fren-
sch, P. A. (2004). The role of antici-
pation and intention for the learning
of effects of self-performed actions.
Psychol. Res. 68, 163–175.
Zwickel, J., Grosjean, M., and Prinz, W.
(2007). Seeing while moving: mea-
suring the online influence of action
on perception. Q. J. Exp. Psychol.
(Hove) 60, 1063–1071.
Zwickel, J., Grosjean, M., and Prinz, W.
(2010a). On interference effects in
concurrent perception and action.
Psychol. Res. 74, 152–171.
Zwickel, J., Grosjean, M., and Prinz,
W. (2010b). What part of an action
interferes with ongoing perception?
Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 134, 403–409.
Zwickel, J., and Prinz, W. (2012). Assim-
ilation and contrast: the two sides of
specific interference between action
and perception. Psychol. Res. 76,
171–182.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 09 August 2012; accepted: 02
November 2012; published online: 23
November 2012.
Citation: Thomaschke R (2012) Investi-
gating ideomotor cognition with motorvi-
sual priming paradigms: key findings,
methodological challenges, and future
directions. Front. Psychology 3:519. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00519
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Thomaschke. This is
an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attri-
bution License, which permits use, distri-
bution and reproduction in other forums,
provided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 519 | 15
